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THE STRUCTURING OF ORGANIZATIONAL ATTENTION
AND THE ENACTMENT OF ECONOMIC ADVERSITY:
A RECONCILIATION OF THEORIES OF
FAILURE-INDUCED CHANGE AND THREAT-RIGIDITY
Abstract
This paper presents a theoretical examination of how organizational
attention structures enact economic adversity. The theory explicitly links the
cognitive psychology that underlies risk-seeking behavior and threat-rigidity with
the social groupings and cultural logic that structure thinking and decision-
making in organizations. Economic adversity leads to neither generalized
failure-induced change nor to generalized threat-rigidity. Adversity induces
problemistic search and modular forms of organizational change, which are biased
by the organization's dominant responses as structured by group integration,
formal information systems, core cultural rules, past organizational experiences,
and mimetic isomorphism.
INTRODUCTION
The effects of economic adversity on stability and change in organizations constitute a
major unexplained paradox facing organizational theory (Singh, 1986; Boeker and Goodstein,
1991; McKinley, 1993). Two contradictory ideas - failure-induced change and threat-rigidity -
have both found theoretical and empirical support. Early adaptationist theories of organizational
decision-making (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963) posit that failure to meet the
organization's aspiration levels leads to failure-induced organizational change, problemistic
search, and organizational learning. More recent theories have extended this argument,
postulating that while successful organizations often ignore changes in their environments, failures
of economic performance lead to corrective managerial action and structural change (Kiesler and
Sproull, 1982; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). The contrary view is held by theories of
threat-rigidity (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981), which argue that adversity leads to
restrictions in information processing, constriction in control, and increased rigidity, rather than
change, in organizations.
Both theories of failure-induced change and theories of threat-rigidity focus on the effects
of adversity on the process of organizational attention and decision-making. Yet researchers and
theorists in both traditions fail to address or explain the contradictory predictions of the
alternative theory. At the level of individual cognition, the findings of prospect theory (Kahneman
and Tversky 1979, 1984) lend support to the view that failure to meet a level of aspiration leads
to risk-seeking under adversity and increased change. Prospect theory and theories of
failure-induced change argue that attention will be focused on the resolution of adversity, and that
risk-seeking behavior will result. In the March-Simon-Cyert formulation, organizational change is
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associated with an "optimal level of stress" (March and Simon, 1958), with "stress" meant as the
discrepancy between the level of aspiration and the level of achievement. Organizations are seen
as less likely to change when performance met or exceeded aspiration levels. Performance below
aspiration levels leads to an expanded focus of organizational attention by searching for new
organizational programs or operating procedures (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March,
1963). Economic adversity leads to increased organizational change, adaptation, and learning.
But cognitive explanations do not, however, uniformly support the view that organizations
are more likely to change under conditions of adversity. Theories of threat-rigidity argue that
information processing will be restricted and individual, group, and organizational attention will
be focused on well-learned, dominant responses. Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton (1981) argue that
under conditions of adversity, a general threat-rigidity effect can be observed in individual, group,
and organizational behavior. Threat, defined as impending loss or cost to the entity, results in
restriction in information used by decision-makers, and in constriction of control. The former
leads to increased attention to internal hypotheses and beliefs, and prior experiences and
expectations; the latter to an increased centralization of authority, more extensive formalization,
and greater standardization of procedures. The combined effects of restriction in information
processing and constriction in control are to increase rigidity in organizational decisions, augment
the tendency toward well-learned or dominant responses, and to decrease organizational change.
The contradiction between theories of failure-induced change and theories of
threat-rigidity remains unresolved for it constitutes, for the most part, an unjoined debate. The
current status of research is that the two different theories are applied to explain different domains
of organizational behaviors or outcomes and little attempt is made to integrate them or to resolve
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the contradictions. Theories of failure-induced change have been invoked to explain a wide variety
of organizational phenomena, linking poor or declining economic performance to executive
succession (Allen and Panian, 1982; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1980), selection of outsiders as CEOs
(Dalton and Kesner, 1985: Helmich and Brown, 1972), strategic adaptation (Chandler, 1962),
changes in board composition (Boeker and Goodstein, 1991), increased R&D expenditures
(Antonelli, 1989), and membership in an R&D consortia (Bolton, 1993). The experimental
findings, at the individual level, by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984) of risk-seeking
under losses and risk-aversion under gains, have been invoked by organization and strategy
researchers (Singh, 1986; Jemison, 1987; Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1988; Bromiley, 1991) to
explain the statistical results, at the macro-organizational level, that low-performing firms
undertake objectively risk-seeking behavior (Bowman, 1982), the so-called risk/return paradox.
These results are in the tradition of the earlier March-Simon-Cyert theories of organizational
decision-making, which imply greater stability when performance exceeds aspiration levels, and
greater change (and risk-seeking) under adversity.
Alternatively, the threat-rigidity thesis has played a central role in studies of
organizational-level responses to financial and economic decline (Greenhalgh, 1983; Cameron,
Kim, and Whetten, 1987; D'Aveni, 1989; Sutton and D'Aunno, 1989), and in studies of how past
successes have led firms to fail to adapt to changes in the current environment (Starbuck, Greve,
and Hedberg, 1978; Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984). Organizations facing performance problems
were found to limit the number of information sources consulted and to restrict attention to
potential solutions in ways that augmented inertial tendencies (D'Aveni and MacMillan, 1990).
Contrary to theories of failure-induced change and of risk-seeking under adversity, studies on
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threat-rigidity and organizational decline argue that adversity leads to restrictions in
organizational cognition, more stable, conservative behavior, and to a decreased likelihood of
organizational change and adaptation.
Although organizational researchers can invoke, expost, theories of threat-rigidity to
explain stability and decline, or theories of failure-induced change to explain change and
risk-seeking behavior, this usage is unsatisfactory. Empirical attempts to adjudicate between the
two sets of theories (Singh, 1986; Boeker and Goodstein, 1991) are also limited if they do not
clearly account for the existence of the two phenomena. The boundary conditions under which
change or threat-rigidity are to be expected remain unspecified, limiting the capacity of the
theories to predict outcomes or to explain fully why either outcome occurs in any particular
instance. This paper seeks a resolution to the conflicting predictions by directly confronting the
paradox posed by both theories. While both theories of failure-induced change and threat-rigidity
are based on cognitive conceptions of organizations, many, if not most empirical treatments
analyze the effects of economic adversity on stability and change in organizations as a behavioral
response to an objective stimulus.
Organizations are subject to a continuous flow of resources to and from their
environments. Loss of customers, new competitors, decreased revenues, competence-destroying
technological innovations, employee strikes, loss of suppliers, increased costs, government
regulations, recessions, exchange rate fluctuations are but some of the examples to which
organizations are constantly at risk and which could result in a potential loss or cost of concrete
resources. But while any resulting economic losses can affect organizational outcomes
independent of the organization's perceptions and cognitive frames, the organization's response is
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shaped by how the organization pays attention to its environment, how economic stimuli are
channeled into organizational decision processes, and how adversity is enacted by the
organization. The effects of economic adversity on organizational actions, as distinguished from
organizational outcomes, are shaped by the organization's enactment of its environment (Weick,
1979; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), and by the allocation of attention out of which organizational
decisions and actions arise (Simon, 1947; March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963;
March and Olsen, 1976; Weick, 1979). The structuring and allocation of attention in
organizations is both a cognitive process, shaped by individual cognition and information
processing (Kahneman, 1973; Neisser, 1976; Holyak and Gordon, 1984), organizational cultures
(Schein, 1985; Martin, 1992), interpretive frames (Daft and Weick, 1984; Dutton and Dukerich,
1991), and institutionalized rules and procedures (Meyer and Rowan, 1978; DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) and a social process, shaped by the division of labor
(Simon, 1947; March and Simon, 1958), group formations (Douglas, 1986), social identities
(Tajfel, 1982; White, 1992) and political coalitions (March, 1962, Cyert and March, 1963).
This paper will confront the paradox posed by conflicting theories of organizational
change under economic adversity by going beyond a stimulus-response model, and examining the
complex social and cognitive processes by which stimuli get attended to, and organizational
responses and actions get constructed. I propose a multilevel approach to studying the effects of
economic adversity on the rate and direction of organizational stability and change, positing that
economic adversity is enacted through the social construction of mental models by participants in
group decision-making, and is regulated by the institutional logic of the organization's cultural
system. This approach views organizational responses to environmental events not as behavioral
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responses to objective stimuli, but as organizational constructions structured by organizational
attention and the enactment of economic adversity.
INDIVIDUAL INFORMATION PROCESSING AND THE ENACTMENT OF
ECONOMIC ADVERSITY
At the level of individual decision-making, economic adversity is enacted and attention is
allocated through the application of schemas in the construction of mental models. Following
Holyoak and Gordon (1984), this paper will use a framework for individual information
processing that builds on two concepts: schemas and mental models. All information and
decision-making is processed through the construction of mental models (Holland, Holyoak,
Nisbett, and Thagard, 1986). Mental models are in turn constructed through the use and
adaptation of existing schemas. Although the concepts of schemas and mental models are often
used interchangeably, I use them to describe two distinct phenomena. Schemas are used to
describe structures of generic knowledge, stored in memory (Rumelhart, 1984). Schemas
represent our knowledge about rules, concepts, categories, events, goals, skills, social situations,
actions, people, groups, etc. Schemas contain the network of interrelationships between their
constituent parts, are embedded within one another, and represent knowledge at all levels of
abstraction. Mental models are working, integrated representations of goals, data, inferences, and
plans, which serve to interpret and attend to environmental stimuli, permit inferences, make
decisions, and guide behavior (Holyoak and Gordon, 1984). Mental models utilize schemas to
interpret environmental stimuli, draw inferences that explain the causes and effects of those
stimuli, and permit mental simulations of the outcomes of alternative plans of action or scenarios.
Schemas serve the functions of theories (Rumelhart, 1984) and are actively used in the
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construction of mental models; mental models can be in turn compared to multivariate statistical
or econometric models (Piore, 1992) where theories are applied to data to make inferences, and
the simulation of alternative policy scenarios are made. The construction of mental models creates
opportunities for revising existing schemas, in a process of accommodation, as their goodness of
fit to data is being processed (Rumelhart, 1984).
An important function of mental models, which remains underexplored, is to focus
attention on the data or environmental stimuli which is included in the model, and to restrict
attention to all others. The construction of mental models, and cognitive process in general, are
goal or task driven (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Thagard, 1986). The incorporation of data
into the mental model will be driven by the goals or tasks at hand, existing schemas, and the
ability to integrate the goals, data, schemas, and plans of action into a consistent model. For any
given set of environmental stimuli, mental models will differ in the amount and variety of data,
schemas, and alternative plans of action that are incorporated into the model. For example, the
mental model of a driver going to work, will attend to less environmental stimuli, will incorporate
more route-specific schemas, and will consider less alternative plans of action than that of a
tourist with her family along the same route. The tourist is concerned with enjoying the scenery,
attends to numerous sights and landmarks along the route, and gives attention to alternative plans
or where to stop, where to turn, and where to go, yet lacks specific schemas of the route (except
for those developed from reading a map, an act which may require constant attention).
Assumption 1: Economic adversity is enacted through the application of schemas which
serve to identify and interpret the existence of adversity.
The effects of economic performance on decision-making can be examined through its
effects on the construction of mental models that selectively attend to environmental stimuli, draw
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inferences on their causes, and select which alternative plans or solutions to consider. Economic
adversity, defined as the perception of loss or threat to the entity, cannot be determined through
an "objective" measure of performance, but is enacted through the application of schemas which
determine which measures of performance are important, and which levels of poor economic
performance or which external events constitute a threat to the status and survival of the
individual, her referent group, or the organizations in which she works.
Assumption 2. Economic adversity increases the attention and effort allocated to
understanding and resolving adversity.
Adversity is associated with increased arousal and psychological drive, increased
motivation to adopt and pursue a task or goal, and increased allocation of effort to information
processing (Kahneman, 1973) associated with that task. Adversity will therefore increase the
effort and attention allocated to the construction of mental models that address and resolve the
problem of economic adversity. This implies that, as long as economic adversity is perceived as
such, individuals will be motivated to address the problem of adversity, and will search for
solutions to address the perceived loss or threat.
Assumption 3. The enactment of economic adversity serves to frame problems as a loss and
to invoke risk-seeking behavior.
To the extent that economic adversity is perceived to threaten the current status or
survival of the individual or entity, the schemas used to address the source of adversity will
categorize it as a loss, rather than as an opportunity (Dutton and Jackson, 1987). Following
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984), individuals will be risk-seeking in the evaluation
of available plans or solutions to deal with the sources of adversity. Note that the effects of
adversity described in Assumptions 2 and 3, are by themselves likely to lead to an increase in the
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rate of search for and adoption of solutions. Any rigidity in response resulting from adversity is
due neither to a deficit of motivation, nor a tendency for risk-averse behavior. To account for
rigidity in behavior, we must look instead to a failure of understanding, and to an inability to
change existing schemas in ways that make new forms of understanding likely.
Assumption 4. Economic adversity causes a narrowing of attention to environmental
stimuli.
The increased arousal resulting from adversity leads to narrowing of attention to wide
cues in the environment to the detriment of peripheral cues, and decreased ability to discriminate
among relevant stimuli (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981). The construction of mental models
will thereby focus on the dominant aspects of the situation, as defined by the existing schemas, at
the expense of other stimuli. The form in which economic adversity is enacted will define the
relevant performance criteria that will receive increased attention, with decreased attention to
other performance measures, and decreased ability to determine which measures, and which
external events, may be relevant to the resolution of adversity.
Assumption 5. Economic adversity increases reliance on well-learned, readily available
schemas for inference and response and the construction of mental models.
Economic adversity leads to increased reliance on readily-available internal hypothesis
about the identity of stimulus objects, less flexibility in the choice of solution methods, decreased
tolerance for ambiguity, and an increased tendency toward emitting well-learned, dominant
responses (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981). Under conditions of adversity, the hypotheses
and plans utilized in the construction of mental models will be less flexible and more focused on
applying existing knowledge contained in well-learned schemas. There will be less likelihood that
existing schemas will be rejected or transformed. Search efforts will be concentrated not on the
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creation of new schemas, but on drawing upon already created schemas and applying them in
understanding and resolving the problem of adversity. The consideration of alternative solutions
will be limited to those that are well-scripted, or in the absence of specific scripts, to those
consistent with the perceived stimuli, and which are contained in readily available schemas.
If we continue the analogy with econometric models, the effects of economic adversity on
the construction of mental models can be compared to the construction of reduced-form models
that limit the number of dependent variables under consideration, simplify causal relationships and
limit the independent variables to those previously considered to be most important.
Reduced-form models are simpler in form than expanded structural-equation models, and as long
as the underlying structure has not changed, prove to be highly efficient for predicting behavior
and guiding action. But like in the case of reduced form models, simplified mental models that
focus on well-learned schemas prove deficient when the environment changes, and when past
understanding and past solutions no longer hold.
Figure 1 incorporates the first five assumptions into a model of how individual-level
information processing and decision-making shapes the enactment of economic adversity. The
model allows us to reconcile, at the individual level, the findings of prospect theory with those of
threat-rigidity. Adversity leads to increased search behavior, but search that is less flexible and
more focused on central environmental stimuli and more dependent on well-known schemas. The
enactment of adversity creates cognitive and motivational forces that narrow the attention of
individuals toward the construction of mental models which concentrate on the resolution of
adversity and which manifests itself as risk-seeking behavior. The narrowing of attention leads to
the exclusion of peripheral environmental stimuli and the invocation of well-learned schemas. It
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should be noted that the experimental results of prospect theory deal with the consideration of
objectively risky, but well-specified alternatives, while threat-rigidity in search deals with the
failure to consider alternative responses that are not well understood, whose outcome is highly
ambiguous, and for which a probability distribution of outcomes is not well-defined. Individuals
may have less tolerance for ambiguity under adversity, but this reduced tolerance at the same time
some form of response is called for, will lead to increased adoption of objectively risky, but
well-known alternatives. The tendency for loss aversion, the restriction of information processing,
and the reduced quality of decision-making under adversity may in fact lead to a subjective
underestimation of the risks involved in the selection of previously experienced responses.
Also note that the increased reliance on available schemas in the enactment of economic
adversity need not imply a failure to respond to the perceived threat or loss. Rigidity of response
entails decreased flexibility in the use of available schemas, but such schemas may themselves
provide readily-available responses that entail organizational change. For example, scapegoating
(Gamson and Scotch, 1964; Boeker, 1992) is a typical response to economic adversity, which
implies the application of a simple schema for explaining and responding to adversity. But
scapegoating results in changes in management and executive leadership, both a form of
organizational change and a precursor to subsequent change.
The examination of the effects of individual-level information processing on the enactment
of economic adversity is a necessary, but not sufficient step in reconciling the conflicting
predictions of theories of failure-induced organizational change and threat-rigidity. The allocation
of attention in organizational decision-making is shaped not just by the individual psychology of
attention, but by the influence of group, organizational, and supra-organizational forces on the
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structuring of attention. First, while framing, narrowing of attention, and construction of mental
models are cognitive processes that occur at the level of individual psychology, cognition and
thinking are social processes (Durkheim, 1965; Douglas, 1986) that are shaped by the social
groupings, organizations, and institutions in which the thinking takes place. Legitimized social
groups provide the classifications for thinking and decision-making (Douglas, 1986) structure
social identities (Tajfel, 1982; Hogg and Abrams, 1988), and provide a logic of appropriateness
(March and Olsen, 1989) by which schemas for interpreting and responding to environmental
circumstances are generated and get invoked.
Second, cognitive perspectives on organizational actions must take into account that
organizations are not unitary actors, but are comprised of individuals with diverse interests,
schemas, and experiences. Individual behavior is shaped not just by narrow self-interests, but by
his or her social and group identifications (Tajfel, 1982; Hogg and Abrams, 1988). While
individuals bring their identities, interests, and schemas into the organization, these identities,
interests, and schemas are themselves shaped by their experience in the organization and its
subunits. Individuals are affected by the social influence of group members, by their attention to
group members with higher status and political power, and by the extent to which their
organizational experience leads them to develop and maintain social identities as members of the
organization and its subgroups. Organizational and group influence on individual information
processing help determine what stimuli to pay attention to, what schemas to use in thinking, and
what potential plans to consider. Iindividual decision- making in groups and organizations is
shaped not just by individual interests and cognitions, but by group cohesiveness and social
integration (O'Reilly, Caldewell, and Barnett, 1989), the structure of participation (Cohen,
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March, and Olsen, 1972; March and Olsen, 1976), the structure of organizational activities
(Stinchcombe, 1968), and the formation of political coalitions (March, 1962; Cyert and March,
1963). Individual decision-making in organizations results from the tension between the interests,
identities, and cognitions that the individual brings to the organization, and the interests, identities,
and cognotions that are invoked by individual participation in organizational activities.
Third, organizations develop a set of structures, processes, and routines that deal with
cognitive limitations of individuals in information processing and decision-making, and which
provide a set of decision premises (Simon, 1947), organizational identifications (March and
Simon, 1958), and rules and routines (Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982; March
and Olsen, 1989) which shape organizational memory (March and Simon, 1958; Walsh and
Ungson, 1991) and decision-making. Theses structures, processes, and routines are structured at
the level of the organization, and these structures are themselves expressive of institutional
isomorphism at the level of the organizational field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), and of the
"rationalizing myths" of modem society (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, Meyer, Boli, and Thomas,
1987). The effects of economic adversity on organizational decision-making must therefore look
to the effects not just at the individual level of cognition, but at the social and cognitive structures
at the group, organizational, and supra-organizational levels.
THE STRUCTURE OF ORGANIZATIONAL GROUPS AND
THE STRUCTURING OF ORGANIZATIONAL ATTENTION
Decision-making and information processing in organizations is neither a solitary activity
undertaken by isolated individuals nor a communal process in which all organizational members
participate equally. Decision-making and information processing in organizations takes place in
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groups, whether they be top management groups, formal organizational subunits, temporary
task-performing groups, or informal social groupings. Group activities alter the normative and
informational social influence of other group members (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955), trigger distinct
social identities (Sherif, et al. 1961; Hogg and Abrams, 1988) through which motivations,
interests, values, and beliefs get defined, and alter the subject, content, flow, and definition of the
situations to which group members get exposed (Lewin, 1952, Stinchcombe, 1968). Group
activities in organizations shape the creation and invocation of schemas for attending, interpreting,
and responding to the diverse situations and environmental stimuli faced by the organization.
Consequently, understanding how attention in organizations is structured under economic
adversity requires that we conceptualize how organizational activities are structured into diverse
groups, how these diverse groups structure the attention of organizational members, and how the
tensions between individual interests, identities, and beliefs and group-level attention focus get
resolved.
Group processes in organizations provide mechanisms for both differentiating and
integrating the focus of attention of organizational members. The differentiation of organizational
attention is shaped by the division of labor in the organization (March and Simon, 1958), as
members of organizational subunits selectively attend to the various subenvironments faced by the
organization (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). The division of labor in organizations differentiates
the foci of attention of individuals through the production and utilization of specialized repertoires
of schemas for attending to distinct components of the environment. In complex, hierarchical
organizations top management serves as a primary mechanism for integrating the diverse
environmental concerns of the organization and for coordinating the utilization of specialized
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repertoires of action invoked by the specialized subunits. While the myriad formal and informal
social groupings in organizations can all potentially shape the attention focus of individuals, I will
concentrate in this paper on two distinct forms that are particularly critical to the differentiation
and integration of attention structures in organizations: organizational subunits, and top
management groups.
Assumption 6. Complex organizations are constituted by subassemblies of organizational
subunits which develop their own distinct social identities, specialized foci of attention, and,
specialized schemas for interpreting and responding to their respective subenvironments.
Complex organizations are characterized by subassemblies of organizational subunits, with
each subunit dedicated to specialized tasks in the division of labor (Weber, 1978; March and
Simon, 1958: Simon, 1962). The division of labor in complex organizations affects the
information received and processed by individuals in organizations contributing to selective
exposure to environmental stimuli, differentiated subgoals, specialized focus of attention, and the
production and reinforcement of social identification of organizational members with the subgoals
of the organizational subunits (March and Simon, 1958). Diverse organizational subunits develop
a differentiated set of information filters, communication channels and strategies to deal with their
respective subenvironments (Henderson and Clark, 1990). These specialized repertoires of action
and communications are embedded in a set of schemas for enacting responses to environmental
stimuli. The specialized focus of attention of organizational subunits is a key link between the
individual and the cultural beliefs and values that get into his consciousness (Stinchcombe, 1968).
Goals, interests, norms, and categorizations of individuals are shaped by the structuring of
organizational activities into subunits and the distinct social identifications that result from those
subunits.
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Assumption 7. In complex, hierarchical organizations, top management groups serve to
integrate the differentiated foci of attention of the diverse organizational subunits.
The differentiation of organizational activities serves to specialize attention into distinct
aspects of the organization's environment, but this creates problems of integrating and
coordinating the activities of the organization (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). The hierarchic
structure of complex organizations provides a formal mechanism for integration through vertical
control of differentiated activities (Simon, 1947). Given the restricted focus of attention of the
various subunits in the organization to the environment, top management groups (Hambrick and
Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 1993) serve as a primary mechanism for coordinating organizational
attention to the diverse environmental contingencies faced by the organization.'
The goals, interests, norms, and categorizations that characterize and constitute the social
identification of group members provide a set of schemas from which mental models can be
constructed. The degree to which individual interests and schemas prevail over shared interests
and beliefs is contingent on the degree of cohesiveness of decision-making groups and the
strength of group identities. An analysis of information processing and decision-making in groups
must therefore take into account both the commonalties of interests and identities among group
members as well as their differences. Groups vary in their level and degree of cohesiveness and
social identification of their members with the group, and in the degree of existing or latent
conflicts between group values, as defined by dominant political coalitions, and those of its
individual members. Consequently, the effects of adversity on group decision-making will be
In organizations constituted by tightly-coupled subassemblies. such as those characteristic of Japanese
"lean" production systems (Womack, Jones, and Roos, 1990), lower-level mechanism for integration, such as
product design teams, are commonly used to integrate both work activities and routine responses to environmental
contingencies. Under such technological systems, organizational attention is less differentiated than in more
loosely coupled systems. More direct coupling of organizational subunits will decrease the identification of
organizational members with their subunits relative to the organization as a whole. A full examination of how
tightly-coupled vs. loosely-coupled organizations differ in their structuring of organizational attention and in the
enactment of economic adversity is an important issue that awaits further investigation.
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contingent on the degree of cohesiveness and the strength of social identity of group members,
and on the extent to which the perceived threat or loss has differential impacts on the interests of
individual group members versus. those of the existing group and its dominant political coalition.
Assumption 8. For highly-cohesive groups, economic adversity will lead to increased
stability in the dominant political coalition. For more fragmented groups with low levels of
cohesiveness or social integration, economic adversity will change the structure of
participation, increase group turnover, and lead to changes in the composition of the
dominant political coalition.
The threat-rigidity hypothesis argues that economic adversity triggers a centralization of
authority in decision-making and constriction of control (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981)
leading to reduction and centralization of participation in decision-making (Hermann, 1963). But
exceptions have been found to the centralization effect under adversity (Gladstein and Reilly,
1985; Argote, Turner, and Fichman, 1989) suggesting that centralization of participation is itself
contingent on the past experience of the decision-making group. Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton
(1981) themselves suggest that adversity may lead to the strengthening of strong links within
organizations and the dissolution of weak links, consistent with the observed dominant-response
effect at the individual level (Zajonc, 1965). Janis (1972) argued that the centralization of
authority and participation experienced in the group-think phenomena is a function of group
cohesiveness. Group cohesiveness and social integration measure the strengths of links between
group members that directly impacts the level of group participation and individual turnover. 2
Social integration or "the degree to which an individual is psychologically linked to others in a
group" (O'Reilly, Caldwell, and Barnett, 1989) is closely linked to cohesiveness, or " the degree
to which members in the group are attracted to each other" (Shaw, 1971). O'Reilly, Caldwell, and
2 For the purpose of this paper cohesiveness and social integration are used interchangeably.
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Barnett (1989) found that social integration moderated the effects of group heterogeneity and led
to lower levels of individual turnover.
While the attention of members of organizational subunits is heavily structured by division
of labor, the attention of members of top management teams is more heavily influenced by the
tension between their individual orientations and those of the subunits they identify with, and the
cohesiveness and social integration of the group. Past organizational history and experience
shapes the degree of group cohesiveness among members of the dominant political coalition, and
establishes the degree to which group membership is likely to remain stable and the power of the
top management group is likely to endure. A group's cohesiveness is shaped by its common social
identities, similar demographic characteristics, and shared objectives and experience. The stability
of a dominant coalition is dependent on the relative absence of countervailing forces that limit a
group's power. Past failures, conflicting goals and values, fragmentation in the sources of power,
and diversity in origins, identities, and experience are all examples of forces that may serve to
weaken group cohesiveness and identification and threaten the stability of a dominant political
coalition.
Assumption 9. Economic adversity will increase interpersonal and intergroup conflict to the
extent that the effects of economic adversity are perceived to have differential impacts on
the resources and status positions of diverse individuals and subunits in the organization.
Economic adversity itself generates pressures for group conflict to the extent that it
generates competition for resources and status in the organization. The identification of
individuals in organizations to the organization as a whole, to specific organizational subunits, or
to individual interests will be shaped by the extent to which the threat or loss to the organization
is perceived as a shared fate by all organizational members, or alternatively as an occasion for
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competition for status, resources, and positions between individuals and organizational subunits.
While the emergence of organizational threats can generate supraordinate goals and pressures for
cooperation, competition for resources generates intergroup rivalry for resources (Sherif, et. al.,
1961). Of particular importance here is the structure of rewards and positions and the nature of
internal labor markets in the organization. If economic adversity is perceived to result in
differential rewards, positions, and job retention, this is likely to generate increased level of
conflict between individuals and groups in the organizations. Similarly if economic adversity is
likely to threaten the distribution of status and resources between the diverse organizational
subunits, greater intergroup competition and conflict is likely to result.
THE STRUCTURE OF PARTICIPATION, THE INSTITUTIONAL LOGIC,
AND THE STRUCTURING OF ORGANIZATIONAL ATTENTION
Organizations continuously face a plethora of situations and stimuli resulting both from
organizational actions and those of individuals within the organization, and from the interplay of
the organization and its members with other individuals and organizations in its environment.
Organizations are bounded in their capacity to assimilate, interpret, evaluate and/ or respond to
these overabundant stimuli and are selective in their attention and inattention to the myriad
situations that it faces and to the range of alternative solutions and responses that it considers.
The bounded capabilities of organizations are conditioned by the limited knowledge, skills
(Nelson and Winter, 1982), and information-processing capabilities of individuals (Simon, 1955),
and by the limited capabilities of organizations to integrate individual knowledge and skills, and to
coordinate individual thoughts and actions. While individuals process information and make
decisions through the application of schemas and the construction of mental models, organizations
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structure the participation of individuals in organizational decision-making and regulate the
allocation of schemas that individuals employ for perceiving, interpreting, and responding to
diverse situations (March and Olsen, 1976). The structuring of organizational attention is shaped
by the structure of social relations and by the logic inherent in the organization's cultural system.
Consequently, an examination of how organizations selectively attend to internal and external
stimuli requires that we consider how the organization's social structure and cultural systems both
facilitate and constrain the consideration of alternative schemas for inference and response.
Assumption 10: Organizational choices are constructed from the repertoires of schemas
available in organizational memory as enacted by participants in organizational
decision-making and as regulated by the institutional logic of the cultural system.
At the organizational level mental models are socially constructed from those schemas
available in organizational memory as governed by both the social structure of participation and
by the systems of rules contained in the cultural system. Organizational memory refers to stored
skills and knowledge from an organization's history that can be brought to bear on present actions
and decisions (Walsh and Ungson, 1991). Organizations possess a repertoire of schemas in
organizational memory that can deal with a wide variety of situations and which are invoked by
organizational participants in the construction of mental models. This repertoire is encoded in
standard operating procedures, organizational programs and routines, formal systems of
information and control, structures and roles, stories and myths, and in the individual and group
experience of organizational members. Organizational members have stored in memory possible
solutions to problems that have been encountered in the past, both by the organizations and by
other entities in its environment. Organization-specific experiences as well as normative and
mimetic institutional processes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) help shape available alternatives.
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These organizational repertoires are used not just in the case of routine situations or standard
operating procedures, but are applied to novel situations by seeking analogies or areas of
commonalty with past situations in the construction of mental models. For example, economic
downturns are often responded to by seeking solutions from past recessions. U.S. corporations
commonly attend to economic downturns by temporary layoffs of their workers. The component
parts of such solutions can also be invoked, and new organizational programs are produced by
combining components parts of solutions stored in organizational memory.
The repertoires of actions available in organizational memory serve as tools, strategies,
and kits for organizational response (Swidler, 1986) to a wide variety of situations. But the
invocation and application of organizational schemas does not result from purely voluntaristic
action by organizational members, but is itself structured by the social groups that participate in
organizational decisions and by the rules and logic of the cultural system. Participation in
organizational decision making affects both the placement in the organizational agenda of
alternative courses of action and the choice among these alternatives. In the case of novel
situations where the choice of actions and their results are ambiguous, organizational participants
will have different interests and identities that will shape the choices to be made. In the case of
strategic and organizational-wide decisions, the memory and experience of top management teams
is most relevant given their greater participation in such decisions (Assumption 7).
Assumption 11: The structure of participation in organizational decision-making is
generated by the division of labor and by the emergence of social groupings and political
coalitions within the organization. Organizational decisions reflect the interests and
identities of participants in organizational decision-making.
The structure of participation in organizational decision-making is critical to an
understanding of how organizations respond to the numerous situations it faces. Who participates
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in a decision process, how much time and attention she allocates to the decision, and who else is
participating are critical determinants of the outcomes of organizational decision processes
(Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972; March and Olsen, 1976). Organizational participation is
contingent on the formal and informal structures of the organization as conditioned by the division
of labor, of emergent social groups and political coalitions, and is embedded in available
organizational routines for responding to organizational situations.
Assumption 12: The institutional logic of the cultural system regulates the allocation of
schemas for perceiving, interpreting, evaluating, and responding to situations.
While the structures of participation regulate the ways in which concrete individuals
partake in organizational decisions and in which their interests and identities affect organizational
choices, the rules for allocating schemas to situations - for deciding which problems get attended
to, which solutions get considered, and which solutions get linked to which situations - operate
with a considerable degree of autonomy from the participation of concrete individuals, and are
reflective of the organization's cultural system. The institutional logic (Jackall, 1988) is the system
of rules, rewards, and sanctions derived from the multiple, contingent, and overlapping social
identities both internal and external to the organization and the way these identities are structured
within the organization. The institutional logic comprises both organizational conventions and
highly institutionalized rules, practices, and procedures. Conventions refer to regularized rules,
and social practices employed by organizations, and sustained by a convergence of means (Weick,
1979) of the diverse participants in organizational practices. Conventions and organizational
routines are a form of truce (Nelson and Winter, 1982), in which the different interests and
identities of the individuals and groups who participate in the convention cooperate in interlocked
behaviors (Weick, 1979) as a result of a process of exchange, bargaining, and extrinsic
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inducements. Conventions may become institutionalized to the extent that they become
taken-for-granted, are sustained by a social identification with what the organization stands for,
and become established through a logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 1989), in which its
application becomes the natural way of thinking and doing.
The institutional logic of organization does not form a coherent cultural system, but
reflects ambiguity, contradiction, and fragmentation (Jackall, 1988; Martin, 1992) consistent with
the multiple and contingent social identities represented in the organization, the fuzzy boundaries
and definitions of its system of rules and classifications, and the diverse situational contingencies
that the organization continually faces. The conflict and contradictions contained within the logic
are resolved through the organizational division of labor (March and Simon, 1958), bargaining
and truce (Nelson and Winter, 1982), and by sequential attention to the diverse rules contained
within the institutional logic (Cyert and March, 1963; March and Olsen, 1989). The fragmentation
and contradictions contained within the logic provide potential sources of adaptability and change
in the selection of organizational repertoires of action, and in responding to the myriad situations
faced by the organization.
Assumption 13: Prior adoption of a program in an organization increases its availability in
organizational memory.
While the institutional logic both enables and constrains the schemas and repertoires of
action that are invoked by the organizations, it is not fully restrictive and allows for multiple
alternatives to be considered. The selection among alternative schemas is conditioned by their
availability in organizational memory. With the organizational adoption of a program of action, it
becomes embedded in the memory of the organization and its members. In the event of a
subsequent opportunity for organizational decision-making, the probability that the this type of
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solution will be invoked by organizational participants is likely to increase. Organizational
restructuring, strategic reorientations, and top management turnover are all examples of programs
of action that when successfully adopted become more salient in organizational memory and
increase the likelihood of subsequent adoption.
Institutional Effects, Culture, and Mimetic Processes. The repertoire of schemas in
organizational memory relies not just on organizational-level experience, but on a broader set of
practices, skills, and routines learned from the organization's sector or field. The institutional
logic of an organization is often incomplete, and organizations rely on the knowledge and
experience of other organizations for responding to ambiguous situations. Organizations capture
the past experience of other organizations and incorporate them into organizational memory
(Levitt and March, 1988). In the case of ambiguity, organizations rely on and mimic the
experience that other organizations are facing or have faced similar conditions (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983).
Assumption 14: Prior diffusion of a program of action in the organizational sector or field
will increase its availability in organizational memory.
Prior diffusion of a plan of action in the organizational field increases the availability of the
solution in organizational memory. Faced with decision-making opportunities, participants look
not only to the organization's own experience but to that of other organizations with which they
are familiar. The wider and the more accepted the diffusion of a particular program of action, the
greater the rate of adoption of the same type of program. Participants in boundary spanning roles
play a critical role in this institutional diffusion of organizational solutions previously experienced
by other organizations in the sector or field. For example, corporate directors may serve to
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enhance organizational memory by bringing to bear the past choices and experience of other
organizations to current decisions faced by the corporation.
EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC ADVERSITY ON
ORGANIZATIONAL STABILITY AND CHANGE
The effects of economic adversity on organizational stability and change is shaped by the
individual psychology of information processing and decision-making, the social and group
psychology of organizational subunits and decision-making groups, the structure of social
relations and the institutional logic of the cultural system, and isomorphic processes at the level of
the organizational field. In previous sections I have successively examined these multilevel
processes and have presented 14 assumptions on how they affect the structuring of organizational
attention and the enactment of economic adversity. In this section, I will present a set of
propositions, derived from the assumptions, that establish the boundary conditions under which
economic adversity increases change and the conditions under which certain forms of rigidity
result. Economic adversity, as enacted by participants in organizational decision-making, leads
neither to a generalized change in all aspects of organization nor to a generalized rigidity in
organizational response. The paradox of conflicting predictions of failure-induced change and
threat-rigidity will be resolved by examining how the allocation of attention structures the process
under which certain forms of organizational change are likely to increase and other types are likely
to decrease.
The multilevel approach presented in this paper examines how the individual psychology
of attention is shaped by the social grouping in which organizational decisions are made. The
model of individual-level information processing and decision-making shown in Figure 1 will be
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applied in the context of organizational subgroups and organizational level decision-making to
derive the propositions on the rate and direction of organizational change.
Proposition 1: Organizational subunits respond to perceived threats in their own respective
subenvironments by increased reliance on specialized schemas and repertoires of action for
inference, interpretation, and response.
This proposition follows from Assumption 1, 5, and 6. Organizational subunits are
differentiated in their attention to the diverse features of organizational environments, and develop
specialized schemas for interpreting and responding to their respective subenvironments
(Assumption 6). At the subunit level, these specialized schemas are applied to enact economic
adversity (Assumption 1). This results in increased use of well-learned repertoires of action for
responding to the perceived environmental threat (Assumption 5). Many, if not most, potential
threats to organizational resources are addressed at the level of organizational subunits.
Specialized organizational subunits attend to such problems as loss of customers, increase in
supplier costs, increase in accounts receivables, and government regulations, among others. The
ability of organizational subunits to identify and respond to potential threats is dependent on the
availability of specialized schemas that give meaning to the threats in the respective
subenvironments. The identification of a perceived threat by the organizational subunit increases
reliance on available repertoires of action for responding to these threats. Most "failure-induced
organizational change" is of this nature. Cyert and March (1963) characterize this form of
organizational response to environmental stimuli as "problemistic search." The increased reliance
by organizational subunits on available schemas for inference and response leads to
"simple-minded, biased, localized search (Cyert and March, 1963)" for responding to adversity.
Organizations decrease prices, increase R&D expenditures (Antonelli, 1989), layoff workers,
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close plants, tighten expenditure control, all as routinized responses to economic adversity.
Problemistic search is a product of rigidity in organizational responses to adversity which results
in routine forms of organizational change by organizational subunits. Problemistic search
exemplifies both "risk-seeking behavior" and "threat-rigidity" as economic adversity increases the
probability of adoption of well-learned dominant responses.
Problemistic search, though routinized, often leads to restoration of economic
performance and removal of the perceived threats from the organizational subenvironments. But
the failure of problemistic search at the level of organizational subunits to remove environmental
threats call may trigger the attention of top management groups. Formal information and control
systems are established to monitor the environment and serve to enact economic adversity.
Proposition 2: Economic adversity is enacted through the formal information and control
systems as interpreted by participants in organizational decision-making.
This proposition follows from Assumptions 1, 11, and 12. Formal organizations establish
information and control systems to monitor their environment, obtain feedback on organizational
actions and trigger organizational responses to environmental feedback. Information systems
shape and embed the schemas available in organizational memory to evaluate and interpret such
stimuli. Failures of economic performance must be enacted by available schemas (Assumption 1)
and the invocation of theses schemas is regulated by the institutional logic (Assumption 12) for
such failures to be enacted as economic adversity. The interpretation of the organization's
information systems will be made consistent with the interests and identities of participants in
organizational decision-making (Assumption 11). Formal accounting systems play a critical role in
the enactment of economic adversity, and in triggering intervention by members of the top
management team. Accounting measures are rarely sufficient, by themselves, to permit
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identification of the underlying causes of decreases in economic performance in organization. The
dependence on accounting systems serves in fact to increase reliance on financial and cost control
measures to respond to deteriorations in performance (Starbuck, Greve, and Hedberg, 1978).
Accounting and management researchers have documented the failures of conventional financial
and managerial accounting systems to assist management in anticipating environmental threats,
and in providing clear links to managerial actions and responses (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987;
Eccles and Nohria, 1992).
Faced with economic adversity, top management groups can either constrain
decision-making to a core group of decision-makers, or open participation to others outside the
core, and turn the threat of economic adversity into an opportunity for forging new political
coalitions. The prior history, cohesiveness, and level of group identity will determine which of the
two paths will be taken. To the extent that the dominant political coalition is cohesive and stable
and its power well established, participation in organizational decision-making will become more
concentrated, and the interests and beliefs of the core dominant group will predominate. To the
extent that the cohesiveness of the dominant coalition is low, and the group identity weak,
economic adversity is likely to increase fragmentation in organizational decision-making, and to
foster changes in the dominant coalition.
Proposition 3: The effects of economic adversity on organization-level decisions depend
upon the social integration and cohesiveness of top management groups. (a) For strong and
cohesive decision-making groups, economic adversity will lead to organizational choices
that reflect the interests and identities of the dominant coalition. (b) For weak or
fragmented coalitions, economic adversity will restructure participation in decision-making
and reflect the interests and identities of newly emerging political coalitions.
This proposition follows from Assumptions 7, 8, and 11. At the organizational level, top
management groups serve to integrate the differentiated perspectives of the different
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organizational subunits (Assumption 7). Economic adversity creates a bifurcation point, in which
either the prevailing political structure will become strengthened and participation restricted, or
alternatively, participation will become more fluid and new political coalitions will emerge. From
Assumption 8, the organizational response to economic adversity affects participation and may
lead to either greater concentration of control in the existing coalition or to greater fragmentation
and political change, depending on the degree of cohesiveness and social integration of the
dominant political coalition. If the former, organizational choices in response to adversity will
reflect the interests and identities of the dominant coalition (Assumption 11), further
strengthening its power. If the latter, group fragmentation will further weaken the power of the
existing coalition, and leads to choices that favor the interests of new participants in the
decision-making process and to an increased probability of emergence of new coalitions of power.
The hypothesized effects of adversity on participation in decision-making differ from those
posited by the threat-rigidity thesis (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981). Constriction of control
and centralization of decision-making are seen in my formulation, not as general processes that
affect all organizational decisions, but contingent on the prior strength of identity and
cohesiveness of top management groups. The group-think phenomena (Janis, 1972) that underlies
constriction of control in the threat-rigidity hypothesis does not equally apply to all
decision-making groups, but is itself contingent on the level of group cohesiveness, the strengths
of the group's social identity, and the stability of power within the group. At the top management
level, the institutionalization of power of the CEO and top management groups is a precondition
for centralization of control. If the power of the CEO is highly institutionalized, economic
adversity will lead to greater entrenchment and a decrease in the rate of executive succession; for
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more fragmented groups, economic adversity will lead to executive succession and changes in the
composition of top management groups (Boeker, 1989, 1992; Ocasio, 1993).
Proposition 4: Economic adversity increases the number of problem-solving decision
opportunities and results in increased risk-seeking behavior.
This proposition follows from Assumptions 2, 3, and 10. From Assumption 2, economic
adversity leads to increased allocation of effort and attention to the interpretation and resolution
of the problems of adversity. At the organizational level, problem-solving decision making is a
taken-for-granted, highly institutionalized (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) characteristic of modem
formal organizations, embedded in organizational memory, where perceived problems require
organizational responses. The increased allocation of effort and attention to the problems of
adversity will make use of available schemas for decision-making such as meetings, task forces,
special projects, deadlines embedded in organizational memory (Assumption 10), and will lead to
an increase in the number of problem-solving decision opportunities. Economic adversity creates a
feedback effect on organizational actions that increases the number of decision opportunities
designed for problem solving. This increase in decision-making opportunities is associated with
the framing of decision-making in the domain of losses (Assumption 3). This results in
risk-seeking behavior on the part of organizations, as evidenced by the risk-return paradox
(Bowman, 1982; Bromiley, 1991).
Note that as in the discussion at the individual-level, risk-seeking behavior at the
organizational level is seen to be consistent with a "threat-rigidity" response. For example,
Starbuck, Greve, and Hedberg (1978) found that one of Sweden's most prestigious newspapers,
Handelstidningen, when faced with economic adversity, responded by increased reliance on the
newspaper's reputation for serious reporting about culture, business, and politics. They
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strengthened the newspaper pages dealing with these areas, at the same time they ceased sports
reporting, decreased crime reporting, and sold news and publishing equipment to obtain cash. For
'six years they continued with the same product strategy despite continued loss in readership. A
rigid attention to the dominant responses of the organization was accompanied by a series of
objectively risk-seeking organizational changes that were designed to cut costs and the spiraling
losses. But after six years of continued losses, the once prestigious newspaper ceased all
operations. Handelstidningen was rigid in its product strategy and in its numerous cost-cutting
moves although these actions resulted in increased (objective) risks for the company.
Proposition 5: Economic adversity concentrates problem-solving attention on the rapid
resolution of problems associated with perceived threats, or losses, to the neglect of other
factors or environmental stimuli.
This proposition follows from Assumption 4 and Propositions 2 and 4. Economic
adversity leads to a narrowing of attention to environmental stimuli (Assumption 4), which is
biased toward the resolution of those problems associated with the perceived threat. Increased
attention to the perceived threats is accompanied by a narrowing of information channels. The
narrowing of attention, accompanied by framing of adversity as a loss and risk-seeking behavior,
(Proposition 4) leads to increased reliance on problems associated with the perceived threat, and
to decreased attention to other forms of organizational change. Accounting systems serve to enact
economic adversity and to direct managerial attention toward financial measures and controls, and
to decrease attention to nonfinancial measures and nonfinancial responses (Proposition 2).
D'Aveni and MacMillan (1990) examined managerial communications of firms facing threat of
bankruptcy and found decreased attention to environmental characteristics and increased focus on
internal and cost characteristics. Starbuck, Greve, and Hedberg's (1978) case studies of
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Scandinavian companies confronted with adversity showed how top managers concentrated their
attention on resolving the problems of adversity, but failed to attend to other environmental
stimuli that affected outcomes. Handelstidningen's managers concentrated their attention on
cost-cutting while ignoring environmental evidence that their readers were interested in both
sports and crime coverage. Facit, a once successful manufacturer of business machines and office
furnishings, when faced with threats from new computer products closed plants and attempted to
reduce costs but failed to realize there was unfilled demand for its typewriter products.
Proposition 6: Economic adversity increases reliance on core cultural assumptions, values,
and beliefs, as interpreted by participants in organizational decision-making, increases the
rate of adoption of solutions that are consistent with the core cultural assumptions and
decreases the rate of adoption of other forms of organizational change.
This proposition follows from Assumptions 5, 12, and Proposition 4. Economic adversity
leads to increased reliance on dominant schemas for inference and response (Assumption 5). Core
cultural assumptions, values, and beliefs provide a set of schemas, readily available in
organizational memory (Walsh and Ungson, 1991) that constitute the dominant rules of the
institutional system. Under conditions of economic adversity, participants in organizational
decision-making will be regulated by the institutional logic of the cultural system (Assumption
12). Due to their centrality, taken-for-grantedness and highly institutionalized status, core cultural
values, assumptions, and belief are more likely to be relied upon for interpreting economic
adversity, and for evaluating alternative solutions. Solutions that are most consistent with core
assumptions and values are more likely to be considered. Given risk-seeking behavior under
conditions of economic adversity (Proposition 4), the rate of adoption of solutions consistent with
core values and assumptions is likely to increase. But the increased reliance on dominant, readily
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available schemas is likely to decrease those forms of organizational change which are less
consistent with core cultural assumptions.
A key assumption of modem industrial corporations, in the U.S. and Western Europe, is
that technological innovation and investment provides a source for achieving competitive
advantage. Much of the evidence for failure-induced change relates to increased investments in
research and development (Antonelli, 1989), or more recently in research and development
consortia (1993). In the U.S. automobile industry, General Motors responded to increased threats
from foreign competition through acquisitions of technology-based companies such as EDS and
Hughes Aircraft, and increases in R&D expenditures as percent of sales from 3.0% in 1971 to
3.9% in 1980 and 4.8% in 1990. But for a long period, General Motors applied increased
technology and automation to the mass production paradigm of manufacturing, without
questioning the manufacturing and human resource principles that underlie mass production.
Meanwhile, Toyota and other Japanese manufacturers had developed and adopted just-in-time,
Kanban, and other forms of lean production system, with less automation and much higher levels
of productivity (Womack, Jones, and Roos, 1990). General Motors responded to the threat of
Japanese competition by massive investments in acquisitions and in new technologies, consistent
with its core beliefs, but failed to respond with changes in its manufacturing principles or human
resource practices that challenged core values and assumptions.
Proposition 7: Economic adversity will increase the rate of adoption of organizational
options or programs previously experienced, either by the organization or by other
organizations in its field, and decrease the rate of adoption of other forms of organizational
change.
This proposition follows from Assumptions 5, 10, 13, and 14, and Proposition 4.
Economic adversity leads to increased reliance on available schemas (Assumption 5). Solutions
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that have been experienced by an organization or other organizations in its field will be more
readily available in organizational memory (Assumptions 13 and 14) and more likely to be
invoked in the process of organizational decision-making (Assumption 10). Given risk-seeking
behavior under conditions of economic adversity (Proposition 4), the rate of adoption of readily
available solutions that have been experienced by the organization or by other organizations in its
field is likely to increase. But the increased reliance on readily available solutions (Assumption 5)
is likely to reduce the rate of other novel forms of organizational change that have yet to be
experienced.
The results of Assumptions 13 and 14, and Proposition 7 combined imply that previous
experience with a form of organizational change (e.g., organizational restructuring, strategic
change, type of managerial succession) will have both a main effect on the rate of subsequent
adoption as well as an interaction effect with economic adversity (i.e., a negative interaction effect
of prior organizational and/or sectoral experience with economic performance). That is, prior
adoption by either the organization or other organizations in its sector will increase the rate of
subsequent adoption of the same type of program, and this rate of increase will be even greater
under conditions of economic adversity. Both main and interaction effects are central tenets of my
proposed theory which are subject to empirical verification.
Proposition 8. Economic adversity will increase the adoption of modular forms of
organizational change that involve the selection, extension, and replication of repertoires of
action at the level of organizational subunits and inhibit forms of organizational change
that require reconfigurations among the activities of distinct subunits.
This proposition follows from Assumption 5, 9, and Proposition 1. Economic adversity
will increase interpersonal and intergroup conflict to the extent that it is perceived to have
differential impacts on diverse individuals and groups in the organization (Assumption 9). At the
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same time, economic adversity leads to increased reliance on dominant schemas for inference,
interpretation, and response (Assumption 5). Increased conflict coupled with narrowing of
attention hinders the renegotiation of implicit and explicit contracts between individuals and
groups in organizations. The quasi-resolution of conflict (Cyert and March, 1963) and underlying
truce that characterizes organizational convention, routines, and standard operating procedures
will be difficult to reconfigure under conditions of adversity and increased political behavior. New
forms of cooperation between diverse interests are less likely to be formed if the individuals or
groups perceive that adversity will lead to differential outcomes. This situation is heightened by
the group identifications, and specialized schemas and repertoires of action adopted, under
conditions of economic adversity, at the level of the organizational subunits (Assumption 1).
Consequently, the adoption of schemas and repertoires of action for interpreting and responding
to economic adversity will be contingent on the level of interpersonal and intergroup conflict
generated by such schemas and on the degree of cooperation required for implementing the
desired behavior. This implies that the selection, replication, and extension of organizational
routines at the level of organizational subunits will be more likely to be adopted than other forms
of organizational change that require reconfiguration or renegotiation of existing implicit and
explicit agreements among diverse individual and group identities in the organization. This leads
to a modularity of response under conditions of adversity.
The prevalence of modular forms of organizational change is associated with the failure of
organizations to respond to competence-destroying architectural innovation (Henderson and
Clark, 1990). In the case of product development, architectural innovation requires change in the
technological reconfigurations among different technological components, and requires extensive
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communication and collaboration among specialized subunits of the organization, which regularly
attend to their own independent components and to the underlying relationship. Henderson (1992)
argues that architectural knowledge is a pervasive issue in organizational transformation that
extends to manufacturing, marketing, human resource management and the interrelationship
between organizational practices. The prevalence of modular forms of organizational change has
also been found in human resource practices (Kochan and McKersie, 1992) and in the adoption of
manufacturing technologies at the plant level (MacDuffie and Krafcik, 1992). Modular forms of
innovation are more readily adopted because they do not involve the renegotiation of explicit and
tacit forms of collaboration between organizational members.
Proposition 9. Under economic adversity, organizational changes that require the
reconfiguration of activities among organizational subunits will be contingent on the
emergence of new political coalitions.
This follows from Propositions 3 and 8. The effects of economic adversity on the stability
of political coalitions is contingent on the cohesiveness and social integration of the coalition at
the time adversity is faced (Proposition 3). While for highly cohesive groups this leads to a
constriction of control and greater concentration of power, for more fragmented groups, new
political coalitions and a reconstitution of top management groups may result. The emergence of
new political coalitions and top management groups provides opportunities for organizations to
engage in reconfigurations that extend across the diverse activities of organizational subunits
(Starbuck, Greve, and Hedberg, 1978; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). The emergence of new
political coalitions is a precondition for the organizational reconfigurations which require new
forms of collaboration among the diverse individuals and organizational subunits of the
organization. At the level of top management groups, organizational reconfigurations are more
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likely with major change in the top management team, not just the CEO. At the level of
organizational subunits this may also require new coalitions and collaboration between diverse
groups, including different forms of cooperation between management and labor (Kochan and
McKersie, 1992).
CONCLUSIONS
The contradictions between theories of failure-induced change and theories of
threat-rigidity have remained so far unresolved. Past empirical research has invoked one or
another theory depending on which outcomes are observed, but this usage is unsatisfactory. This
paper develops a multilevel theory of the effects of economic adversity on individual, group, and
organizational decision-making that presents a theoretical resolution to the conflicting predictions.
A set of nine propositions are presented to explain the effects on organizational decision-making
processes and on the rate and direction of organizational change.
The principal thesis is that while economic adversity, as enacted by the organization,
induces problem-solving search and increases the quantity of organizational decisions, its effect on
the direction of organizational change is contingent on the social construction of mental models
by participants in organizational subunits, as regulated by the institutional logic of the cultural
system. The institutional logic is contained in the formal information systems, core cultural
assumptions, values, and beliefs, and in past history and experience in the organization and its
organizational field. Economic adversity leads to neither generalized failure-induced change nor to
generalized threat-rigidity. Economic adversity induces localized problemistic search biased along
the direction of the dominant schemas for inference and response. Economic adversity will
increase the adoption of those types of organizational change that (1) have been well-learned,
38
III
whether through prior organizational experience, or through institutional mimetic processes, (2)
that are congruent with core assumptions and beliefs, as interpreted by organizational
decision-makers, and, (3) that favor the interests and identities of participants in the
decision-making process. Organizational changes that alter the structure of relationships along
organizational subunits are less likely to the extent their implementation leads to intergroup
rivalries. Contrary to the original threat-rigidity thesis, the effects of adversity on constriction in
control are posited to hold only for organizations with highly stable and cohesive power
structures. If organizational power is highly fragmented, economic adversity will lead to more
fluid participation and provide opportunities for the formation of new political coalitions.
This paper presents a resolution to the paradox of conflicting theories and findings of
threat-rigidity vs. failure-induced change through a theoretical synthesis and extension of the
attention-based theory of organizations (Simon, 1947; March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March,
1963; Stinchcombe, 1968; March and Olsen, 1976; Weick, 1979). A principal contribution of this
paper is to link explicitly, through a revised model of the structuring of organizational attention,
the individual cognitive psychology that underlies risk-seeking behavior and the threat-rigidity
response with the social relations and cultural logic that structure thinking and decision-making in
organizations. This paper extends the attention-based view, first, by incorporating, at the
micro-level, recent formulations by cognitive psychologists on the role of schemas and mental
models on information processing and decision-making. At the macro and organizational subunit
level, it accounts for the effects of hierarchical structures on the differentiation of organizational
attention (Lawrence and Lorch, 1967), which were present in the Simon (1947) and March and
Simon (1958) formulations, but absent from many, if not most, later works. This paper explicitly
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links the treatment of repertoires of action in organizational memory to a culturally-based logic of
how the diverse schemas and repertoires are organized and invoked. Finally, the paper
incorporates the findings of the new institutionalism (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991); attention is
shaped not just by organizational-level culture and cognitions, but by the rules, cognitions, and
isomorphic processes constituted at the level of the organizational field (DiMaggio and Powell,
1983).
The proposed solution to the theoretical paradox provides a set of guidelines to orient
subsequent research and explain conflicting empirical findings and interpretations. First, it
emphasizes the subjective nature of economic adversity, and the role of existing schemas, at the
individual level, and of formal information systems, at the organizational level, in enacting poor
economic performance as a potential loss or threat to the entity. While the enactment of adversity
is implicit in both theories of failure-induced change and theories of threat-rigidity, it is not always
recognized as such in empirical research. Formal information systems in for-profit organizations
are dominated by short-term accounting and financial measures of performance. Economic
adversity will be enacted by the organization to the extent that it is reflected in the existing
information and control systems. Studies of the effects of threats to economic viability of an
organization must distinguish between failures of enactment, in which the environmental threat
(e.g., entry of new competitors) is not reflected in a timely manner in the formal systems of
information, and failures of understanding. In the latter, organizations act in response to the
perceived adversity, but the existing schemas embedded in the culture and organizational
experience contribute to errors of inference, rigidities in applying cultural assumptions and beliefs,
and an overeliance on past solutions.
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Second, the theory highlights the predominance of problemistic search and routinized
forms of organizational change as responses to economic adversity. Most forms of
"failure-induced change" are routine, local, and biased (Cyert and March, 1963). Problemistic
search is a result of both "risk-seeking behavior" and "threat-rigidity." Under conditions of
environmental stability reliance on local, routine change will lead to a resolution of perceived
economic threats. But organizational failures may result if the organization is confronting
non-routine changes in its environment and existing routines and repertoires of action do not lead
to restoration of economic performance.
Third, threat-rigidity effects take the form of increased attention to isomorphic pressures
at the level of the organizational field. Observed organizational responses to adversity often
reflect the adoption of practices previously diffused throughout the organizational field. Under
conditions of ambiguity and stress, organizations rely, not just on internal models of action, but on
the experience of other organizations in its field for interpreting, and responding to environmental
stimuli. Mimetic isomorphism biases the direction of organizational change under adversity
toward forms of organizational solutions that have been previously adopted by other
organizations. Business consultants and managerial researchers provide corporations with "best
practices" which are adopted in response to economic adversity. Current examples include total
quality management, business reengineering, benchmarking, team-based production and product
development, and the networked organization. But fundamental innovation, which has not been
experienced by other organizations, is less likely under conditions of economic adversity.
Fourth, the proposed theoretical reconciliation emphasizes the predominance of modular
forms of organizational change, and the increased difficulties in undertaking organizational
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reconfigurations under adversity. Problemistic search is most often conducted at the level of
organizational subunits, and typically consists of the selection, extension, and replication of
existing organizational conventions and routines. Changes in organizational and technological
architectures that require reconfigurations among organizational subunits increase potential
sources of conflict, and are less likely to be adopted. Changes in the dominant political coalitions
are a precondition for forms of organizational change that require renegotiation of the implicit and
explicit contracts between the diverse groups and individuals in organizations.
Finally, this paper highlights the rule-based nature of organizational change under
adversity. Rules affect organizational responses both in terms of problemistic search and in the
selection among alternative organizational conventions and routines. The institutional logic of the
cultural system provides a set of core cultural rules, assumptions, norms, and values that guide
which types of organizational solutions are appropriate and under what conditions. Not all forms
of organizational change are equally likely. Earlier, I discussed the institutionalized nature of
technological change, and its increased utilization under conditions of adversity. In the U.S.,
scapegoating is an organizational solution deeply embedded in core cultural assumptions about
individual managerial responsibility and control (Jackall, 1988). While this increases the likelihood
of CEO and executive succession under conditions of adversity, other forms of organizational
change, such as employee participation in corporate governance, and flattening of managerial
compensation violate core cultural assumptions and are less likely. In Japan, responses to
economic adversity are regulated by different rules and cultural assumptions; employee layoffs, a
dominant response in the U.S. for both cyclical and structural restructuring, is not considered
appropriate by Japanese management.
42
11
Organizations experience political and cultural constraints on their actions at all times, not
just under economic adversity. The theory proposes, however, that these effects become even
stronger under conditions of adversity, as cognitive and motivational effects serve to narrow the
focus of organizational attention, and as cohesive groups become more stable in their social and
political structures. The increased focus and rigidity in response that results from economic
adversity need not imply that a failure of understanding necessarily follows. To the extent that the
environment remains fundamentally unaltered, increased focus and attention to past assumptions
and solutions are likely to increase the organization's abilities to improve its economic
performance.
Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton (1981) argued that the threat-rigidity cycle was a short run
effect, and that in the long run, organizations would be able to learn from failures that result from
the adoption of well-learned responses. While organizations are likely to adopt other types of
change in the long-run, the narrowing of attention and reliance on cultural assumptions and beliefs
is likely to continue as long as economic adversity prevails. While a theory of organizational
learning and cultural change is beyond the scope of this paper, my assumptions about the use of
existing schemas embedded in the institutional logic imply that core cultural assumptions and
beliefs are not easily changed. It is more likely that substantial organizational change results from
changes in the political structure of participation, and from the emulation of solutions and
practices adopted by other organizations in its field.
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